








The purpose of this paper is to defend a particular kind of cinematic realism, anti-illusionism, 
which is the thesis that cinematic motion is real.  Following a brief introduction to realism 
and cinema in §1, I analyse Berys Gaut’s taxonomy of cinematic realism and define anti-
illusionism in §2.  §3 contrasts the anti-illusionist theories of Gregory Currie and Trevor 
Ponech with the illusionist theories of Andrew Kania and Gaut.  I reconceptualise the debate 
in terms of Tom Gunning’s cinematic animation in §4, focusing on the question of cinematic 
singletons.  In §5 I argue that cinematic singletons both exist and undergo objective 
displacement – and thus for anti-illusionism.  I conclude, in §§6-7, with responses to potential 
objections to my argument from Kania and Gaut. 
 
1. Cinematic Reality 
 
André Bazin is probably the best-known film theorist identified with realism and was one of 
the founding editors of the influential Cahiers du Cinéma (Notebooks on Cinema) in 1951.  
After his death in 1958 four volumes of his film criticism were collected in a series entitled 
What is Cinema?  Bazin wrote of ‘true realism’, ‘pseudorealism’, ‘expressionist realism’,1 
‘impressionist realism’,2 ‘ontogenetic realism’,3 ‘integral realism’,4 ‘poetic realism’,5 ‘Italian 
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neorealism’,6 ‘photographic realism’,7 ‘realism of subject matter’, ‘realism of expression’, 
‘realism of space’,8 and ‘absolute realism’.9  He nonetheless associated realism in the arts – 
including cinematic art – straightforwardly with resemblance and championed what is now 
known as the deep focus style over the montage style on the basis of the former’s ‘integral 
realism’, i.e. its ability to reproduce reality as it is rather than reality as it is interpreted by the 
director.10  Siegfried Kracauaer is acknowledged as being responsible for the first systematic 
and ultimately the most comprehensive realist film theory, which is set out in Theory of Film: 
The Redemption of Physical Reality, first published in 1960.  Kracauer wrote of ‘naïve 
realism’,11 ‘camera-realism’,12 ‘cinematic realism’,13 ‘surrealism’,14 ‘social realism’,15 and 
‘neorealism’.16  Like Bazin’s, Kracauer’s realism was based on the photographic medium of 
the cinematic art form.  Kracauer’s cinematic realism was in fact camera-realism and his 
clearest definition of the concept is presented in his definition of the true film artist, who  
 may be imagined as a man who sets out to tell a story but, in shooting it, is so 
 overwhelmed by his innate desire to cover all of physical reality – and also by a 
 feeling that he must cover it in order to tell the story, any story, in cinematic terms – 
 that he ventures ever deeper into the jungle of material phenomena in which he risks 
 becoming irretrievably lost if he does not, by virtue of great efforts, get back to the 
 highways he has left.17 
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Bazin and Kracauer were (1) concerned exclusively with the photographic aspect of film and 
(2) placed the emphasis on reproduction (of reality as it is) over representation (of reality as it 
is interpreted by the director).  The former opens the theorists up to the criticisms of medium 
specificity and the latter to what Edward Hudlin calls ‘a naïve acceptance of the doctrines of 
the “innocent eye” and the “artless style”’.18 
    
Both the phenomenological-hermeneutic and analytic traditions were relatively slow to turn 
their attention to film as the subject of philosophical reflection.  Stanley Cavell’s The World 
Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (1971) was a precursor to Gilles Deleuze’s 
Cinéma I: L’image-mouvement (Cinema I: The Movement-Image, 1983) in the former and 
Noël Carroll’s Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory and Mystifying Movies: 
Fads and Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory (both published in 1988) in the latter.  
Deleuze completed his philosophy of film with Cinéma II: L’image-temps (Cinema II: The 
Time-Image) in 1985, but it was ten more years until the publication of the first systematic 
cinematic aesthetics, Gregory Currie’s Image and Mind: Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive 
Science.  Currie defines his philosophy of film as realist on the basis of his stance on three 
theses: illusionism, transparency, and likeness.19  There are two types of illusionism 
associated with film, cognitive and perceptual, and Currie rejects both.  He first dismisses the 
‘Imagined Observer Hypothesis’, the claim that the viewer believes that he or she occupies 
the position of the camera and is therefore present in the story.20  He then dismisses the 
weaker illusionist thesis, which is that the movement of images onscreen is illusory.21  
Transparency was a term used by Kendall Walton to describe what Currie calls the 
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‘Presentation Thesis’, the idea that photographs present rather than represent their subjects.22  
Both Currie’s rejection of transparency and perceptual illusionism are controversial and are 
discussed below.  Currie endorses likeness as central to cinematic ontology and argues that: 
‘Likeness is a coherent thesis, and that it is possible to achieve a considerable degree of this 
kind of realism in film.’23  Currie’s cinematic realism remained dominant for over a decade in 
cinematic aesthetics despite his focus on photography and his failure to anticipate the 
significance of the developments in digital technology that were taking place at the end of the 
century.24 
 
2. Cinematic Realism 
 
In A Philosophy of Cinematic Art, Berys Gaut identifies three different categories of motion 
picture: object-generated, handmade, and mechanically-generated.25  Object-generated 
motion pictures have existed since at least the tenth century CE, in the form of Indonesian 
and Chinese shadow puppet plays.  Handmade motion pictures include flip-books, magic 
lanterns, the thaumatrope, the phenatakistocope, the zoetrope, the choreutoscope, and the 
praxinoscope (all of which predate mechanically-generated film).  Mechanically-generated 
motion pictures began with Edison’s kinetoscope and the Lumière cinématographe – both of 
which used film stock – and the category includes subsequent electronic and digital 
developments.  My interest is in cinematic representation broadly construed, i.e. as including 
all three of Gaut’s categories of cinematic art, a position I have defended elsewhere.26  He 
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23 Currie, Image and Mind, 79. 
24 This is not to underestimate the contribution of Carroll to cinematic aesthetics, a field in which he was both 
the first and the most prolific author.  Most of Carroll’s contributions have been articles and essays, however, 
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sets out a taxonomy of seven distinct kinds of realism that are relevant to all cinematic 
representation.  The first five are: 
 (a) Content realism: the characters, settings, and action in a fictional   
  representation are of a kind that exists in reality.27 
 (b) Photorealism: the animated image of a character, setting, or action in a  
  representation is indiscriminable from a photographic image of the  
  character, setting, or action.28 
 (c) Ontological realism: a photographic image has a causal rather than intentional 
  relation to that which is represented because the representation is created by 
  the capture of light waves emanating from that which is represented.29 
 (d) Epistemic realism: a photographic image offers strong although not conclusive 
  evidence that that which is represented existed at the time the photographic 
  representation was created.30 
 (e) Perceptual realism: the characters, settings, and action in a representation look 
  (and sound) like their counterparts in reality.31 
Content realism concerns what is represented.  Photorealism and perceptual realism are both 
aspects of formal realism and describe how the content is represented.  Ontological and 
epistemic realism move beyond aesthetic concerns with realism to the metaphysical and 
epistemic respectively.  When one compares cinematic representation to other, similar, modes 
of representation – such as pictorial, photographic, and theatrical – in terms of (a) to (e), it is 
obvious that cinematic representation has the greatest scope for realism.  Only photographic 
representations can be realist in all five senses, but cinematic representations have a much 
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greater scope for (e) because they can represent both the movement and the sound of that 
which is represented. 
     
Gaut’s sixth kind of realism is transparency, which I mentioned in §1 in my summary of 
Currie and which continues to be the subject of extensive debate in philosophy.  The idea that 
a photograph is transparent rather than opaque – that it presents rather than represents that at 
which the camera is pointed – is encapsulated in both Bazin and Kracauer’s cinematic realism 
and was recognised by film theorist Rudolf Arnheim when he claimed that ‘the film is on its 
way to the victory of wax museum ideals over creative art.’32  Roger Scruton developed this 
notion to claim that photography – and therefore film – was not a representational art form 
because a photograph is a reproduction of reality, ‘merely a simulacrum of its subject.’33  As 
previously noted, Walton refined Bazin’s idea to claim that photographs were literally 
transparent, that ‘we see the world through them.’34  Dominic Lopes has a more radical view, 
arguing that transparency is ‘the key to explaining experiences of pictures of all kinds’, i.e. 
that both handmade and photographic pictorial representations are transparent.35  Gaut offers 
a concise and convincing response to Lopes, Walton, Scruton, and the film theorists that 
preceded them, defending the claim that ‘there is a simple and intuitively plausible necessary 
condition for when we really see something: we do so only when rays of light from the object 
pass directly into our eyes.’36  As such, contra Lopes, all pictorial representations (whether 
handmade or photographic) are opaque rather than transparent and as cinematic 
representation is representation by means of displays of moving pictures, all cinematic 
representations are opaque. 
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Gaut’s seventh kind of realism is illusionism, but as illusionism is an un-, anti-, or non-
realistic conception in the context of cinematic representation I shall employ Trevor Ponech’s 
‘anti-illusionism’ instead.37  Illusionism is the thesis that ‘films standardly create an illusion 
in the minds of their spectators’.38  I shall therefore define anti-illusionism as follows: 
 Anti-illusionism: cinematic representations do not standardly create an   
 illusion in the minds of their spectators. 
Gaut notes that two types of illusion are in question, cognitive and perceptual.  Cognitive 
illusions concern the belief of the spectator and in film theory usually include one or both of 
the beliefs that (i) the fictional characters, settings, and actions are real and (ii) that the 
spectator is in their presence.39  As mentioned in §1, Currie provides a convincing refutation 
of the cognitive or strong illusionist thesis.  Perceptual illusions may – but need not – involve 
false beliefs, as Gaut states: ‘I may know in the Müller-Lyer illusion that the two lines are of 
the same length, yet my experience represents them as being of different lengths.’40 In 
cinematic representation, the illusion in question is the movement of pictures.  In Gaut’s 
contribution to the Philosophical Studies symposium on Image and Mind, he offered broad 
support of Currie’s realism, understood as the acceptance of likeness and rejection of 
transparency and illusionism.41  Gaut has subsequently developed his view and maintains that 
‘the apparent movement of still images in all kinds of cinema other than object-generated 
ones (shadow plays) is illusory.’42  The issue of whether the moving pictures in a cinematic 
representation actually move has generated sporadic debate in the last twenty years, with 
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Gaut and Andrew Kania in support of illusionism and Currie, Ponech, and myself in 
opposition.43 
 
3. Cinematic Illusion 
 
There are at least two reasons why the illusionism versus anti-illusionism debate is 
unsatisfactory as it stands: (a) conflation between the denotation and connotation of “illusion” 
and (b) its piecemeal nature.  The first of these is illustrated by the original appearance of 
cinematic representation in philosophy, in Plato’s Republic.  Plato explains his theory of 
forms by means of the simile of the sun, the analogy of the divided line, and the allegory of 
the cave.44  Of these three, the allegory of the cave is the most comprehensive, distinguishing 
the four ontological categories of representations, objects, concepts (forms), and the first 
cause (form of the good).  The allegory begins as follows: 
 Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an entrance 
 a long way up, which is both open to light and as wide as the cave itself.  They’ve 
 been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs fettered, 
 able to see only in front of them, because their bonds prevent them from turning their 
 heads around.  Light is provided by a fire burning far above and behind them.  Also 
 behind them, but on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the 
 fire.  Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of 
 puppeteers above which they show their puppets.  [...]  Then also imagine that there 
 are people along the wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it – statues 
 of people and other animals, made out of stone, wood, and every material.  And, as 
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 you’d expect, some of the carriers are talking, and some are silent.  [...]  Do you 
 suppose, first of all, that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another 
 besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front of them?  [...]  And if they 
 could talk to one another, don’t you think they’d suppose that the names they used 
 applied to the things they see passing before them?  [...]  And what if their prison also 
 had an echo from the wall facing them?  Don’t you think that they’d believe that the 
 shadows passing in front of them were talking whenever one of the carriers passing 
 along the wall was doing so?  [...]  Then the prisoners would in every way believe that 
 the truth is nothing other than the shadows of those artifacts.45 
The prisoners in the cave are at the lowest epistemic level because they believe that the 
representations (shadows) are real when both representations and the objects used to create 
them lack the reality of concepts (forms).  Crucially, the prisoners are being deceived by the 
shadow play they are watching and this pejorative sense of illusion has re-emerged in the 
contemporary debate. 
 
Currie notes the distinction between the real, apparent, and illusory (and argues that 
cinematic motion is apparent).46  Gaut introduces the notion of deception when he states that 
apparent motion in cinema (object-generated excluded) is a perceptual illusion that may also 
be a cognitive illusion because some of the audience may believe that the pictures are 
actually moving.47  Tom Gunning is explicit on the issue: ‘I say producing the perception of 
motion, rather than the illusion of motion, which carries a tone of denigration and a distrust of 
perception.’48  Having identified the type of realism I shall be discussing as anti-illusionism 
in §2, I shall clarify that the opposing thesis carries no connotation of denigration or distrust 
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and that illusionism about cinematic representation could be considered very similar to E.H. 
Gombrich’s thesis about pictorial representation in Art and Illusion.  Referring to a cartoon 
by “Alain” (Daniel Brustlein) in The New Yorker Magazine, Gombrich writes: 
 What Alain’s Egyptian boys had to learn before they could create an illusion of reality 
 was not to “copy what they saw” but to manipulate those ambiguous cues on which 
 we rely in stationary vision till their image was indistinguishable from reality.49 
It may well be the case that movement is not represented by copying movement in nature, but 
by carefully manipulating the vision of the audience until the represented movement becomes 
indistinguishable from natural movement, an illusion of reality that need not involve any kind 
of cognitive deception. 
 
The second problem with the debate thus far is its piecemeal nature, which takes two separate 
forms.  First, Kania’s paper is a response to Currie and Ponech’s paper a response to Kania 
and Currie.  My paper discusses all three, but not Gaut and Gaut discusses only Currie (albeit 
with a brief mention of Kania).  No one has taken all four of the main approaches – Currie, 
Kania, Ponech, and Gaut – into account in resolving the debate.  Second, the debate is not 
unified with respect to the definition of cinema employed.  Gaut discusses all three categories 
– object-generated, handmade, and mechanically-generated – but the rest of the contributors 
have been concerned exclusively with mechanically-generated cinema.  Compared to the 
debate about transparency the debate about illusionism is neither sustained nor consistent and 
consequently remains unresolved.  In the remainder of this paper, I shall provide an anti-
illusionist solution to the problem that takes all four approaches and all three categories of 
cinema into account. 
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As Ponech points out, illusionism is by far the dominant view and, as Kania points out, 
Currie does not offer a positive argument for his anti-illusionism, merely placing the burden 
of proof on the illusionist.50  Currie’s burden of proof claim and his subsequent comparison 
of cinematic motion with the Müller-Lyer illusion are not articulated with a great deal of 
conviction in Image and Mind, but Ponech sets out Currie’s position in a less conjectural 
manner.51  Ponech defines a genuine illusion as an appearance that is subject to independent 
verification.52  This is easily done for the Müller-Lyer illusion by measuring the two lines 
with a ruler or more sophisticated instrument, but not – according to Currie – for cinematic 
motion.  Kania’s response to Currie is to argue precisely that cinematic motion is subject to 
independent measurement and verification by means of slowing down the speed of projection 
of the cinematic representation: 
 As one begins to see the frames being replaced by one another, and the apparent 
 motion disappearing and reappearing with changes in the speed of projection, one 
 sees that (or rather how, since I think almost no one believes the images are really 
 moving) the motion is illusory.53 
Kania employs an entertaining example of John Wayne’s distinctive stride in a shot of The 
Searchers to claim that slowing down the speed of the projection reveals that cinematic 
motion is unlike the ‘garden-variety motion possessed by such things as my bicycle as I ride 
to school’ and therefore illusory.54 
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Ponech responds to Kania by claiming that slowing down the projection speed is not 
equivalent to measuring the Müller-Lyer lines because the question concerns cinematic 
movement, i.e. the movement of images in the cinematic experience, and the viewer who sees 
the frames being replaced by one another is no longer having a cinematic experience.  ‘All 
we thereby glimpse is a quasi-cinematic display momentarily deprived of one of its 
ontological primitives.’55  The difference between a cinematic display and quasi-cinematic 
display recalls Deleuze on the movement-image.  Deleuze, who – like Ponech – is concerned 
with mechanically-generated traditional film, distinguishes the photogramme from the 
movement-image as follows: 
 Cinema proceeds with photogrammes – that is, with immobile sections – twenty-four 
 images per second (or eighteen at the outset).  But it has often been noted that what it 
 gives us is not the photogramme: it is an intermediate image, to which movement is 
 not appended or added; the movement on the contrary belongs to the intermediate 
 image as immediate given.  […]  In short, cinema does not give us an image to which 
 movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image.  It does give us a 
 section, but a section which is mobile, not an immobile section + abstract 
 movement.56 
In “Cinematic Realism Reconsidered”, I developed Ponech’s claim about a quasi-cinematic 
display to argue that there are necessary conditions for a cinematic experience and that those 
conditions produce a response-dependent rather than illusory motion of images on the 
screen.57  That argument took the existence of reception conditions for the experience of 
works of art as a premise and cannot therefore be employed here as I am presently concerned 
with all cinematic representations not just the subset of those cinematic representations that 
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are also works of cinematic art.58  Ponech’s response to Kania is nonetheless convincing if 
one considers the positive argument he makes for cinematic motion. 
 
Ponech is concerned with a ‘class of artefacts which involve structurally and functionally 
coupling an informative projectable with an exhibition device’ and distinguishes a visual 
display from both the display format and the screen.59  The first distinction is similar to the 
rejection of medium essentialism and his focus is on the visual display, which is ‘our 
proximal perceptual object’.60  The visual display has two essential features, pixels and 
stroboscopic motion.  Pixels are ‘spatially-temporally separated points of light arrayed on a 
light diffusing surface’ and stroboscopic motion ‘the display’s temporal frequency […] the 
continuous transformations a display undergoes, transformations partly constitutive of it.’61  
Stroboscopic motion distinguishes mechanically-generated motion pictures from other means 
of representation (including handmade motion pictures) and generates singletons.62  A 
singleton is 
 a visible structure standing out from its background and other such structures in its 
 vicinity.  As such it is one perceptual target, perhaps among many, present in the 
 display space […] it is not an abstract entity but a tangible object of experience.  
 Viewers are in sensory contact with it and have perceptual representations which are 
 about it.63 
Singletons are real and are not reducible to their constituent pixels or to any part of the visual 
display.64 
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The concept captures the intent of Currie’s claims that: (a) the cinematic ‘image is a 
particular thing, and a thing that moves’;65 (b) ‘cinematic images are real objects, 
reidentifiable across time and occupying different positions at different times during the 
viewing of the shot’;66 and (c) cinematic images are ‘images of reidentifiable physical 
objects’ or, more simply, a cinematic image is a ‘particular reidentifiable thing’.67  Ponech 
then returns to Kania’s definition of garden-variety motion, which requires: (i) an object and 
(ii) the occupation by that object of ‘contiguous spatial locations at contiguous moments in 
time.’68  He claims that a singleton – for example, W, the cinematic image of John Wayne in 
The Searchers – is an object in the relevant (perceptual) sense and that this object undergoes 
‘continuous stroboscopic displacement’, i.e. objective displacement within the visual display.  
The retrospective introduction of the concept of singletons into the debate yields the 
following positions: 
 (A) Singletons are subjectively real and their motion is objectively real (Ponech). 
 (B) Singletons and their motion are subjectively real (Currie). 
 (C) Singletons and their motion are illusory (Kania). 
       
5. Cinematic Animation 
 
Before returning to Kania’s objection and addressing Gaut’s objection, I want to bring the 
above three positions into line with Gaut, i.e. consider all three categories of cinematic 
representation.  Ponech’s singletons are generated by stroboscopic motion – by the 
stroboscopic motion of pixels – and stroboscopic motion is dependent upon the propagation 
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and outward direction of light by an exhibition device.69  I mentioned that Ponech restricts his 
interest to mechanically-generated motion pictures, but I want to note two points about the 
similarity of the experiences of watching The Searchers and being held prisoner in Plato’s 
cave.  First, while there is no exhibition device as such in the cave the shadow puppeteers 
(unwittingly in the allegory) make use of the projection of light by the fire to generate 
representations on the wall.  The shadows appear to move and although there are no pixels in 
the sense that Ponech employs there are picture elements, which is how he defines pixels: 
‘technical jargon for “picture elements”’.70  Second, although Ponech uses stroboscopic 
motion to describe motion on analogue and digital screens, it is also described as the 
continuous transformations a display undergoes, transformations partly constitutive of it – 
which applies to the transformations of shadows on the cave wall as much as the television 
screen on which The Searchers appears.  Matching the combination of the broader senses of 
picture element and continuous transformations is a broader sense of singletons, which 
Ponech characterises as ‘individuals which undergo objective displacement.’71  The prisoners 
see individual shadows distinct from other shadows and from the cave wall itself and these 
shadows appear to move (and make sounds).  With these broader delineations in mind, if one 
considers flip-books as an example of handmade cinematic representations, the displays once 
again seem to involve individuals who appear to move albeit without an exhibition device 
propagating and outwardly directing light. 
 
In his essay on Henri Bergson’s theory of cinematic motion (which is only tangentially 
relevant to the illusionism question), Gunning approaches the issue from a perspective 
distinct from both Bergson and Deleuze on the one hand and cinematic aesthetics on the 
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other, employing the concept of animation.72  Cinematic animation is ‘the technological 
production of images in motion.  Thus all cinema can be approached as animation.’73  The 
two essential elements of animation are: (a) the perception of motion (b) achieved by 
technological means.  Gunning employs perception rather than illusion for the reasons noted 
in §3 and proposes a broad understanding of technological: 
 This may sound obvious and even tautological, but I would point out the key term 
 here, technological, as something generally taken for granted, indeed rendered 
 invisible, in realist accounts of the moving image.  The technological aspect can be 
 deceptively simple (as in the flip book) or the product of complex technical 
 elaboration (as in computer-generated imagery).  It refers to a control of the 
 presentation of images at specific thresholds of speed so as to affect their visual 
 perception.74 
Gunning’s concern is film theory’s dual failure to recognise the significance of cinematic 
motion to cinematic art and failure to account for cinematic motion.  His approach is useful 
here as it employs terminology that is neutral between object-generated, handmade, and 
mechanically-generated cinematic representations such that cinematic animation can take the 
place of stroboscopic motion.  As such, Ponech’s argument can be reconstituted for cinematic 
motion, rather than for mechanically-generated cinematic motion, in the following terms: 
 (i) The essential properties of cinematic displays are picture elements and  
  animation. 
 (ii) The combination of picture elements and animation in the cinematic  
  display generates cinematic singletons, which cannot be reduced to their  
  constituents. 
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 (iii) Cinematic singletons undergo continuous animated displacement, i.e.  
  objective displacement within the cinematic display. 
Set in this more inclusive terminology, there are two objections to Ponech, one that 
challenges the existence of cinematic singletons (Kania) and another that challenges the 
continuous animated displacement (Gaut). 
 
6. Cinematic Singletons? 
 
Kania’s response to Ponech would simply deny cinematic motion on the basis that garden-
variety motion requires an object.  Kania does not insist on a physical object rather than an 
object of perception, he simply denies that there is anything – physical or otherwise – to 
move: there ‘is no single reidentifiable image which is moving.’75  This is the purpose his 
John Wayne walking example serves.  When one experiences the shot frame by frame one 
sees that the individual images that constitute Ponech’s W – w1 to wn – are distinct from one 
another, showing different parts of the actor from different distances and angles, and cannot 
therefore be identical.  Kania would not, however, be able to provide a satisfactory response 
to Ponech’s claim that the frame-by-frame experience is a quasi-cinematic display 
momentarily deprived of one of its ontological primitives.  Cinematic representation is 
distinguished from related modes of representation as follows: (a) cinematic representations 
involve pictures rather than people or objects (unlike theatre, including puppetry); and (b) 
cinematic representations involve real or illusory motion (unlike photography and painting).  
Regardless of whether that motion is real or illusory it must be experienced in order for the 
mode of representation to be instantiated.  An equivalent case for pictorial representation 
might be standing so close to a Rembrandt painting that one can discern the texture of the 
                                                 





brushstrokes, but not see the shapes that they constitute.  The texture of the brushstrokes is 
partly constitutive of the whole pictorial representation, but does not create an illusion of 
shape.  Gunning’s take on the ontological primitives of the cinematic experience is a product 
of his conception of cinematic animation: 
 Animation depends not simply on the transformation of still images into motion – 
 which Bergson declared impossible (one cannot derive motion from immobilities) – 
 but rather on a transformation of perception, a melding of the human sensorium and 
 the machine.76 
This combination of perception and technology in animation is reminiscent of Deleuze’s 
distinction between the photogramme and the movement-image: cinema does not give us an 
image to which movement is added, it immediately gives us a movement-image.77 
 
For Kania, motion requires something that moves and freezing the frames shows that there is 
no thing to move.  I cannot respond by claiming that cinematic representation simply is 
representation by means of displays of animated singletons because that would beg the 
question of whether cinematic motion is real or illusory.  My objection is, instead, a reductio 
ad absurdum.  If one allows that a series of isolated components of a particular mode of 
representation (frozen frames in cinema) is conclusive in determining the ontology of that 
mode of representation (no identical pictures therefore no singleton), one would be able to 
reach numerous paradoxical conclusions about familiar modes of representation: not only 
would individual brushstrokes reveal that there was no (real) shape in pictorial representation, 
but moments of silence in a musical representation would reveal that there was no (real) 
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pitch.  The latter example is in fact taken from Kania’s own work on musical silence.  He 
identifies four kinds of silence – measured, internal unmeasured, external unmeasured, and 
quasi-measured – and claims that ‘any of these kinds may be an integral part of a larger 
musical whole.’78  The isolation of repeated rests, grand pauses, or caesuras does not show 
that there is no real pitch or sound in the experience of music any more than the isolation of 
stationary images shows that there is no real singleton in cinema.  One could object to my 
response by claiming that pure music is not usually considered a mode of representation, but 
the same point could be made about popular music or performed poetry.  The frozen frames 
in The Searchers do not reveal the absence of singletons any more than the caesuras in 
Milton’s Paradise Lost reveal the absence of meter.  As such, Kania cannot claim that there is 
no object that moves. 
 
7. Cinematic Motion? 
 
Gaut does not address the question of cinematic singletons, but seems to assume that there is 
something – a singleton, a particular reidentifiable thing, or a succession of still images – that 
appears to move.  I shall discuss his objection in terms of singletons, noting that if Gaut is 
read as denying the existence of singletons, then my response to Kania above applies.  For 
Gaut, movement in shadow plays is real, but not movement in flip books or films.  His 
objection to Currie’s anti-illusionism is as follows: 
 Genuine movement is continuous: i.e., things do not jump from one spatial point to 
 another without successively occupying all the intervening points between the start 
 and end points.  Yet sequences of cinematic images, i.e. light-patterns on the screen, 
 are not continuous in this sense.  So they do not move: they are a succession of still 
                                                 





 images.  Contrast the case with shadow plays: if I make the shape of a rabbit with my 
 hands in a projector’s light, then when the shadow moves, the shadow will occupy all 
 of the intervening points between the start of the sequence and the end.  A film of the 
 shadow play might be perceptually indiscriminable from the shadow play, and so 
 would present itself as if the image sequence were continuous: but it would not be 
 continuous, and hence there would be a mere illusion of movement.79 
Gaut follows his objection with a comment on Currie’s likely response, which is that the 
‘movement of the image supervenes on the pattern of light particles striking the screen.’80  
The idea is that the cinematic singleton (image) possesses properties that the picture elements 
(pattern of light particles) do not, properties that include movement.  Gaut offers a 
perfunctory dismissal of this non-identity claim before taking Currie to task on a separate but 
related point about the necessary conditions for genuine movement.  Currie holds that ‘at 
each place on the screen occupied by the image as it moves, there should be illumination at 
that place (and at the relevant time) on the screen’, but Gaut notes that audiences spend 
roughly half their time watching a film in darkness and that the continuous illumination of the 
screen is illusory.81  While this is a conclusive objection to Currie’s necessary condition of 
illumination, it does not address the non-identity claim.  Gaut needs to refute only one of the 
two, however, as Currie’s anti-illusionism is dependent upon the combination of non-identity 
and continuous illumination. 
 
Neither Ponech’s stroboscopic motion nor Gunning’s cinematic animation nor the hybrid of 
the two I employed in §5 require continuous illumination, so Gaut’s objection to my position 
must be on the basis of the non-identity claim, about which all he has to say is: ‘I doubt 
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whether Currie’s non-identity claim is correct’.82  Gaut accepts that non-identity between a 
singleton and its constituent elements would defeat his continuity condition for genuine 
movement and the question upon which the debate hinges is thus whether the cinematic 
singleton is identical with its constituents, specifically individual pictures (for handmade 
cinematic representations) and patterns of light (for mechanically-generated cinematic 
representations).  Gaut’s doubt must be weighed against Ponech’s account of stroboscopic 
motion, discussed in §4: 
Say that L and Ln are a metre apart in display space.  The stroboscopic event (w1 , – , 
w2) … is how W travels between the two locations, in eight seconds, by traversing all 
of the intervening points along its route in the visual display.  All there is to be seen of 
the singleton’s displacement is presented in the display.  Stroboscopy advances W 
from L to Ln without eliding any intervening phases and moments of its displacement 
or arresting its progress.  The interval (–) is not an interruption of that movement but, 
rather, part of the underlying process bringing it about.  Of course, W does not move 
invisibly between flashes.  It moves because of them.  In normal episodes of 
continuous stroboscopic displacement, like the one I have been describing, there is an 
accompanying package of simultaneous transformations to the singleton.  
Stroboscopy interacts with subtle structural and other visible differences between w1, 
w2, …  Consequently, parts of W change position relative to each other; likewise W 
and its parts change size, shape, brightness, sharpness, attitude, pitch, and so on. 
Jointly, W ’s displacement and accompanying transformations seem to be the external 
source of the marvellous impression of smooth, continuous motion that cinema 
affords spectators.83 
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If one considers that John Wayne walking in The Searchers could be represented by 
mechanically-generated cinema (as in Kania’s example), object-generated cinema (Wayne in 
Plato’s cave), or handmade cinema (a flip-book of the narrative), the singleton W is generated 
by the combination of the picture (photograph, shadow, or drawing) with the animation 
(stroboscopy, walking, or page-turning) in the cinematic display (screen, wall, book).  In the 
cases of the mechanically-generated and handmade cinematic representations respectively, W 
does not move invisibly during the flashes and flippings, it moves because of them.  Ponech 
claims that his account supports the thesis that cinematic motion is neither merely illusory 
(contra Kania) nor merely veridical (contra Currie), but objective displacement within the 
cinematic display – or continuous animated displacement in my hybrid version.84          
 
My view is that Ponech’s positive account of cinematic motion is more compelling than 
Gaut’s doubt about non-identity, but for those who are not convinced I shall conclude my 
response to Gaut with an indirect, but perhaps more momentous, objection.  In §2 I made my 
agreement with Gaut’s ontology of film clear: despite the apparently great differences in the 
experiences of reading one of Bovril’s advertising flip-books and watching Alejandro G. 
Iñárritu’s The Revenant (2015), both are experiences of cinematic representation.85  Gaut’s 
reconceptualization of cinematic representation is valuable in severing cinematic 
representation from the photographic representation with which it was often conflated in the 
twentieth century and in placing the digital revolution in cinema in perspective, revealing that 
it is not a new mode of representation, but a return to the pre-photographic salience of the 
picture in cinema.  If I am right, then Gaut has made a major contribution to film theory and 
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cinematic aesthetics by showing that there is no essential distinction among object-generated, 
handmade, and mechanically-generated cinematic representations.  If Gaut’s illusionism is 
right, then object-generated cinema is distinct from the other two categories in one of its two 
main elements and I think this is dangerous ground for the ontology that forms the basis of 
his philosophy of cinema.  Gaut would of course respond by claiming that the experience of 
motion is the same in all three cases, using his example of a film of a shadow play being 
perceptually indiscriminable from the shadow play quoted above.  Having argued that object-
generated, handmade, and mechanically-generated displays of moving pictures are all 
cinematic representations, however, it seems to invite objection to state that while all three 
categories involve pictures, the other essential element – motion – is ontologically different 
among them.  In other words, Gaut can safely refute Currie’s continuous illumination, but the 
refutation of non-identity has the potential to unravel his own cinematic ontology and perhaps 
even his philosophy of cinema. 
 
My defence of anti-illusionism has taken the following form: 
 (i) Cinematic representation occurs by means of cinematic displays. 
 (ii) The essential properties of cinematic displays are picture elements and  
  animation. 
 (iii) The combination of picture elements and animation in the cinematic  
  display generates cinematic singletons, which cannot be reduced to their  
  constituents. 
 (iv) Cinematic singletons undergo continuous animated displacement, i.e.  
  objective displacement within the cinematic display. 
    (v) Objective displacement within the cinematic display is inconsistent with the 





 (vi) Therefore cinematic motion is real rather than illusory. 
One might well ask if and why the question of cinematic motion is significant.  My view is 
that cinematic representation is characteristically realistic, i.e. that cinematic representation 
has the potential for all of content realism, photorealism, ontological realism, epistemic 
realism, perceptual realism (discussed in §2), and anti-illusionism (discussed in §§3-7).  Anti-
illusionism, or the reality of cinematic motion, is thus a component of the characteristic 
realism of cinematic representation.  Once again, one may ask if and why the question of 
cinematic realism understood in terms of the characteristic realism of cinematic 
representation is significant.  The most substantial reason is the relationship between realistic 
representation and cognitive value.  Broadly speaking, a representation is cognitively 
valuable to the extent that it provides knowledge of the world as it is in itself, a description 
that is relevant to all six of the components of characteristic realism.  The potential for the 
cognitive impact of cinematic representation has increased exponentially with the 
development of digital technology from the desktop to the laptop to the handheld device and 
with the increasing availability and use of that technology.  Ironically, given the first 
appearance of cinematic representation in philosophy, the mode may be the most effective 
means of education available to philosophers in the twenty-first century.  The argument for 
characteristic cinematic realism is beyond the scope of this paper, however, so I rest my case 
with the more modest argument for cinematic realism as anti-illusionism, i.e. cinematic 
motion is real. 
 
